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UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 






In re:  JAMES ALBERT D'ANGELO, SR. & CAROLYN MARIE D'ANGELO, 
                                             Debtors  
 
CAROLYN MARIE D'ANGELO; JAMES ALBERT D'ANGELO, SR., 




JP MORGAN CHASE BANK, NATIONAL ASSOCIATION 
______________ 
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania 
(District Court No. 2-14-cv-02084) 
District Judge: Hon. Jan E. DuBois  
______________ 
 
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit L.A.R. 34.1(a) 
January 11, 2016 
______________ 
 
Before: MCKEE, Chief Judge, AMBRO, and SCIRICA, Circuit Judges 
 








                                                          
* This disposition is not an opinion of the full court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not 




MCKEE, Chief Judge 
 James Albert D’Angelo, Sr. and Carolyn Marie D’Angelo appeal the order of the 
District Court affirming the Bankruptcy Court’s dismissal of Count Nine of their Second 
Amended Complaint with prejudice. For the reasons that follow, we will affirm.   
I. 
 Because we write for the parties who are already familiar with the facts and 
procedural history, we set forth only the background necessary to our conclusion.  The 
District Court affirmed the Bankruptcy Court’s dismissal of the D’Angelos’ attempt to 
invalidate their note and mortgage pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 544(a) and (b).  The District 
Court also held that the Bankruptcy Court had properly concluded that the Rooker-
Feldman doctrine barred review of the state court’s equitable lien order.  
 While the § 544 appeal was pending, the D’Angelos commenced another 
proceeding, seeking to avoid as a preferential transfer the equitable lien against the 
property pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 547.  The Second Amended Complaint filed by the 
D’Angelos contained a total of nine counts.  The Bankruptcy Court initially dismissed all 
of the counts in the D’Angelos’ Second Amended Complaint, except Count Nine, which 
sought to avoid the equitable lien as a preferential transfer.  In reviewing Count Nine, the 
Bankruptcy Court concluded that the equitable interest acquired by JPM through the 
equitable lien was an interest assigned to JPM in 2006 when JPM succeeded to the 
interests previously held by the prior mortgagee of the property.  The Bankruptcy Court 
characterized the equitable lien as an “equitable assignment” or “subrogation.”  Therefore 
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no interest of the D’Angelos was transferred to JPM during the preference period as 
required by § 547(b).  This appeal followed.  
II. 
 We review the Bankruptcy Court’s decision de novo.1  We exercise plenary review 
over the District Court’s legal determinations.2  The Bankruptcy Court’s decision will not 
be disturbed absent “a clearly erroneous finding of fact, an errant conclusion of law, or an 
improper application of law to fact.”3 
 The primary issue before us is whether the Bankruptcy Court correctly found that 
the D’Angelos could not establish that the 2011 equitable lien order imposed by the state 
court transferred a property interest to JPM such that it was a voidable transfer under 11 
U.S.C. § 547(b).  This provision allows a bankruptcy trustee to recover certain transfers 
of interests in property made by a debtor within 90 days prior to filing a petition in 
bankruptcy.4 
 The D’Angelos allege their original pleadings demonstrate that the equitable lien 
involved a transfer of an interest in their home and JPM’s admission to fraud establishes 
                                                          
1 See In re Hechinger Inv. Co. of Del., 298 F.3d 219, 224 (3d Cir. 2002) (citing In re 
Telegroup, Inc., 281 F.3d 133, 136 (3d Cir. 2002)). 
2 See In re Trans World Airlines, Inc.,145 F.3d 124, 131 (3d Cir. 1998). 
3 In re 15375 Memorial Corp., 589 F.3d 605, 616 (3d Cir. 2009) (citing In re SGL Carbon 
Corp., 200 F.3d 154, 159 (3d Cir. 1999)). 
4 There are several elements that a debtor must satisfy to establish such a claim: (1) a 
transfer of an interest of the debtor in property; (2) the transfer was made to or for the 
benefit of a creditor of the debtor; (3) the transfer was made on account of an antecedent 
debt; (4) the transfer was made while the debtor was insolvent; (5) the transfer was made 
either (a) within ninety days of the petition date; or (b) if the creditor was an insider, 
within the year of the petition date; and (6) the transfer enabled the creditor to receive 




that the equitable lien involved an interest of the D’Angelos unlawfully transferred to a 
fraudulent actor as a matter of law.  However, as the Bankruptcy Court succinctly and 
correctly explained, the equitable lien given to JPM consisted of nothing more than the 
equitable lienholder’s right of subrogation to the rights of the prior lienholder.5  It did not 
constitute an assignment of an interest of the D’Angelos’.  The Bankruptcy Court 
correctly reasoned that, since § 547(b) requires an actual transfer of an interest in 
property, the assignment between the lenders fell outside of the scope of § 547(b).  
 To the extent that the D’Angelos argue the equitable lien transferred an interest of  
theirs where none existed before—allegedly as a result of JPM’s fraud—the District 
Court concluded that it was deprived of jurisdiction pursuant to the Rooker-Feldman 
doctrine.  That conclusion was correct because summary judgment was entered against 
the D’Angelos in state court before they filed for bankruptcy in federal court.6  
III. 
 For the reasons set forth above, we will affirm. 
                                                          
5 See Lewis v. Diethorn, 893 F.2d 648, 651 (3d Cir. 1990); In re Bridge, 18 F.3d 195, 201 
(3d Cir. 1994).  
6 See Rooker v. Fidelity Trust Co., 263 U.S. 413, 415-16 (1923) (holding lower federal 
courts are courts of original, not appellate, jurisdiction and lack federal jurisdiction to 
review final judgment entered by a state court); Madera v. Ameriquest Mortgage Co. (In 
re Madera), 586 F.3d 228, 232 (3d Cir. 2009).  
